The Government of Uganda established external agencies as part of the control mechanisms aimed at promoting accountability in the public sector in general and local governments (LGs) 
Introduction
The competences and commitment of external agencies that are expected to serve as vanguards of public sector accountability have been repeatedly questioned, amid continued reports of local governments' mismanagement and poor service delivery in Uganda. While the reports continue to highlight weaknesses in internal controls, the external agencies of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and the Inspectorate of Government (IG) are, in principle, expected progressively to strengthen the internal mechanisms. In the wake of continued blame on the internal mechanisms of LGs, it becomes necessary to "audit the auditors" by undertaking institutional analysis of the external agencies' capacity to execute their mandates.
The performance of any organisation or agency largely depends on the magnitude of the responsibility/tasks before it and the strength of its institutional capacity. The institutional capacity elements include organisational structural arrangements, human and financial resources, enabling legislation, planning capabilities, and the support from the agency's environment through its different stakeholders. Regarding the public institutional capabilities to enforce accountability, there is a need for any mandated agency to attain adequate numbers of qualified, motivated and facilitated human resources, and an enabling policy environment. Also of paramount importance also is the ability to undertake meticulous corporate planning, mobilisation of sufficient financial resources, and managing intergovernmental relations (collaboration) with stakeholders.
The above aspects form the main themes of analysis in this article, upon which the capacity of the OAG and IG in enhancing accountability in Uganda's local government sphere was evaluated. The discussion begins with conceptualisation of the notions of accountability and control as espoused in management (public management). This is followed by highlights of the structure and activities of the OAG and IG, before a substantial examination of the various capacity elements associated with the two institutions is done. The paper draws on a series of key informant interviews in 2008 with senior staff from the OAG, IG, and district offices.
Control and Accountability in Public Management
Control is a critical management function, besides planning, organising and leading/directing. Control as a managerial function and activity seeks to protect against waste and deviation from planned activities and to ensure effective human and material resources utilisation. Control guides human and organisational behaviour towards achieving goals and objectives. While policy and plans may be perfect, this alone cannot guarantee Control and accountability are critical in fostering public service provision, good governance and development. Accountability is the answerability for performance; or in the case of public sector realm, it is the obligation to expose, explain and justify actions taken on behalf of delivering services to the public (Basu, 1994) . Accountability has become the cornerstone of public management because it constitutes the principle that informs the processes in which those who hold and exercise public authority can be held responsible or answerable for their actions or inactions (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000) .
The rationale for control and accountability in public administration and management has been reinforced by the ideals of good governance in which decentralised local governance is seen as a tool to promote democracy and development. But because the local systems in Uganda, as elsewhere in the developing world, lacked capacity to monitor and probe the local bureaucracies, central government institutional mechanisms, including the IG and OAG were established to promote intergovernmental relations and nurture local capacity within the framework of decentralisation. The IG and OAG in Uganda, thus, form part of the monitoring and supervision tools in intergovernmental relations, in respect of the Constitution of Uganda (1995: Article 176) , which enshrines democratic decentralisation and development.
The ability to control and enhance accountability largely depends on the institutional capacity of an agency, which is derived from both the inherent/internal resources/systems and the support received from the external environment factors that can strengthen the internal processes in the achieving objectives. Thus, the capacity of the IG and OAG to control and enhance accountability in the context of this article -is viewed from two main perspectives. First is the resources at the disposal of these agencies, which facilitates or inhibits their capabilities to control (execute) the mandates. Second is the support from other agencies, exhibited in the intergovernmental relations, which has either strengthened the institutional capacity (through progressive and collaborative support) or has weakened the capacity to control by creating a dependency or by frustrating the efforts of the IG and OAG.
The above insights are explored in the following sections of this article. It is, however, imperative to first look at the nature of the workload (mandate) and structure of the OAG and IG, which forms a basis for analysing the control systems and capacity profile for these agencies.
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Structure and responsibility of the Office of Auditor-General (OAG)
The OAG is charged with the cardinal duty of promoting accountability and good governance in public offices. In Uganda, the OAG is the supreme audit institution that is mandated to audit all public accounts and report to Parliament, to enable it to exercise its oversight role over the use of public resources (Constitution of Uganda, 1995: Art. 163 [3] ).
The OAG is required to conduct financial and value-for-money audits in respect of any income, or expenditure involving public funds, across all the spheres of government, including the local governments.
The OAG is headed by the Auditor-General as Chief Executive, assisted by the Assistant Auditor-General and an Under Secretary. The office is composed of three directorates and two departments. The directorates include central government, local government and statutory/divestiture. The departments include finance and administration, value-for-money audit, and audit development and quality assurance.
The Directorate of Local Government Audits was specifically established to supervise and coordinate the activities of various regional branches, which audit over 1000 accounts from different
LGs. The OAG has established eight upcountry regional branches to ensure thorough and timely audit of all LGs including districts, municipal and town councils, and sub-counties.
While the establishment of regional OAG branch offices is commendable, the eight regional offices were found to be too few to cover the whole country and effectively scrutinise 1060
LGs' accounts, comprising 163 districts and municipal authorities, 897 lower local governments (LLGs) in form of sub-counties and town councils. The Directorate of Local Audits is overwhelmed by the magnitude of local accounts, majority of which are not audited in the stipulated time required by law, due to shortages of staff and financial facilitation.
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The workload schedule of the OAG is voluminous and overstretching their capacity The table indicates an overwhelming number of LG accounts that were carried forward from the previous year (587). This suggests serious capacity shortfalls in human and financial resources and system drawbacks. These shortfalls will be explored later in the paper.
Structure and responsibility of the Inspectorate of Government (IG)
The IG is headed by the Inspector General of Government (IGG) The relevance of this structure is that, all the directorates in one way or another work on matters pertaining to accountability in LGs. The DROFU oversees and coordinates the activities of the 10 established regional offices, which deal with complaints from districts.
The DEP occasionally engages LGs and civil society in sensitisation programmes to promote accountability, while the DLA leads in prosecuting cases of corruption and abuse of office.
The IG functions and responsibilities are vast and stretch across the central and local government spheres. The IG is obliged to undertake measures to ensure the rule of law in public offices, accountability and integrity among public officials, and transparency in the Parliament -2006 Parliament - & 2007 The above reveals that a large number of complaints are not concluded within the reporting period of six months, which suggests a higher workload and serious capacity deficits.
The regional offices of the IG that handle cases from upcountry districts are also overwhelmed by the workload. The figures in Table 3 below indicate the rising trend of cases received at the regional offices outside Kampala -the IG headquarters.
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Human Resources Capacity
The high level of workload described above, points to the need for the IG and the OAG to have appropriate quantity and quality of human resources to execute statutory mandates. The increasing number of local authorities created as new districts in recent years has not been matched with the staffing levels at the regional offices. In a span of only two years, The staffing situation of the OAG as represented in Table 4 shows deficiencies, with 73 vacant positions in the various units. However, this number does not represent the actual staff shortfalls, as 394 is only a ceiling set by the Ministry of Public Service, which is far below the staffing levels required to deal with the magnitude of workload. Nonetheless, there is some effort by the IG and the OAG to build capacity through training programmes in form of induction courses for new recruits, refresher training and skills development. The IG for example has benefited from skills training in surveillance and investigation techniques, transparency and fraud detection, combating corruption in the delivery of infrastructure services, leadership and change management, and result-oriented management.
The problem though, is that many training programmes are often short-term and spin-offs from donor projects, and they rarely address the serious institutional human resources capacity needs. Yet, the donors often, and unilaterally so, withdraw or switch funding to other 'priority' areas, which makes capacity building rather, sporadic.
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It is noteworthy, that despite the willingness on the part of many staff, especially in the middle -lower management levels to undertake training to boost their qualifications, the IG 
Finance and Material Facilitations
The (IG-CADP, 2004 -2009 As earlier noted, the IG and the OAG have regional offices that continue to be overwhelmed by an increasing number of LGs in the wake of new districts creation. All these regional offices operate in rented premises, which do not only constrain the limited budget outlay, but also render it cost-ineffective in the long run. The regional offices were ill-equipped; having (IG-CADP, 2004 -2009 Regarding the OAG, the agency proposed a total expenditure of Shs. 9,470,000,000/-for the Table   1 ).
Records from the OAG indicate that staff salaries are not spared by the budgetary cuts from central government. While the OAG required Shs. 2,300,000,000 to pay salaries of 394 staff members, only Shs. 2,010,000,000 was provided by the Finance Ministry, leaving a funding deficit of Shs. 290,000,000 (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007). The OAG has not been able to audit the activities undertaken in districts relating to the use of poverty alleviation funds (PAF), to which it is mandated. The PAF was set up to provide one route of attaining the objectives of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The Auditor-General acknowledged this in his policy statement (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007) .
Due to the large number of projects undertaken under PAF in all local governments, including Sub-counties, Town Councils, Municipalities, Districts and Central Government Ministries and Departments, the OAG has found it difficult to satisfactorily cover all the areas due to inadequate resources.
An examination of how the investigation cases before the IG were handled during the and 909 (27%) for the two periods, respectively, were investigated and concluded. Such backlogs and the related capacity deficiencies undermine accountability in LGs.
Parent and Enabling Legislation
Conventionally, all organisations are miniature replicas of the laws and regulations that create and maintain them. The legislative framework sets the jurisdictional rhythm of any organisation, in terms of functions, powers, privileges, relationships, and resource capacity.
Thus, legislation becomes a major tool in analysing the institutional and functional capacity of any agency.
The study identified good and elaborate pieces of enabling legislation available to the IG and OAG to foster accountability in LGs. These include:
• The Constitution of Uganda, 1995; Nonetheless, the challenge is in the operationalisation and observance of the law.
Compliance with the law is important because, just like in the principles of exercising justice, "it must not only be said to be done, but must be seen to be done". Despite the array of legislation, the legal regime does not seem to offer an environment that helps in deterring offenders. According to the Deputy Inspector General of Government (IGG), "the law is apparently very lenient and it does not provide deterrent sentences to perpetrators of whitecollar crime that the Inspectorate prosecutes". 28 The law affords the magistrates a wide discretion to determine sentences and the option of a fine is often imposed. The convicted persons are thus made to pay small amounts of money as fines, which creates no deterrence to corruption.
For example, in a court case (Uganda vs Balinda) where the accused, an agent of Kampala City Council (KCC) was contracted to collect rates he solicited and received a bribe of Shs 500,000/=, and was sentenced to one and a half years in prison or pay a fine of Shs 30,000/= (approx. US$15). He paid the fine and walked home (IG-Report, 2007: 62) .
Another case (Uganda vs Tabaruka James) involving a public officer who was charged and convicted of corruption and abuse of office for soliciting and receiving a bribe of Shs 2,000,000/=; the court sentenced him to either two years in prison or a fine of Shs. 300,000/= (U$150). He paid the fine and walked away (IG-Report, 2007: 62) . Table 7 provides a summary of status of compliance by the accounting officers in submitting accounts to the various OAG regional branch offices. 
Support from Other Agencies/Stakeholders
The success in the battle against the ills of public sector ineptness largely depends on collaboration and support from stakeholders at national and local levels. The major constraint faced by the IG and the OAG is that some institutions that are supposed to be partners in fostering accountability, delay or completely ignore the IG's and the OAG's recommendations. The IG is required by the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 (Art. 231) to submit to Parliament at least once in every six months, a report on its performance and make recommendations pertaining to performance of public institutions. The IG also forwards part of its report to local government authorities, where matters concern them. In principle, Parliament and such authorities are supposed to discuss these reports and implement the recommendations.
However, Parliament and local authorities have not been enthusiastic enough on this.
Parliament hardly discusses such reports, let alone following on the recommendations contained. 29 The reason often given to the IG is that "Parliament is very busy and occupied by equally important business". such watchdog institutions, but also squanders the opportunity to better public sector management. The need to consider reports timely and exhaustively by the relevant authorities is underscored by Hanekom and Thornhill (1986: 115) who argue that "if the compilers of reports know that they are to be analysed in detail, they are often encouraged to provide a faithful review of their activities", and the reverse is also true.
The study revealed that, negative attitudes, corruption and intransigence in the institutions that are supposed to be partners in fighting graft frustrate the IG and the OAG. Some institutions/officials take unnecessarily long or just ignore to take action on queries raised by the IG and the OAG, against those implicated. Parliament, 2006 and 2007 Deficiencies in institutional collaboration also arise in prosecution of court cases. Court cases take a long time to be disposed offconcluded and this adversely affects prosecution, as witnesses get overtired, lose interest in cases, face intimidation, and some even die before ruling is delivered (IG-Report, 2007 Figure 2 shows that for more than a year , out of a total of 52 cases prosecuted by the IG, only 12 had been concluded (as convictions, dismissals or acquittals), and eight cases awaited judgment in the courts. A total of 40 cases were still on-going, suggesting deficiencies in offering support to the IG, from courts and other stakeholders.
Jurisdictional Limitations
Jurisdictional limitations provide another challenge. While the IG and the OAG can investigate, audit, query and pass verdict on the performance of any public entity, they often have no powers to overturn the results of poor administration and managerial malfeasance. Bernt and Owen (2000) argue that, even in highly acclaimed Western democracies like Canada, the provincial ombudsmen can only afford remedial recommendations, with relatively weak mechanisms to enforce them. At best, they can forward reports to higher authorities in government. This means that the enforcement of IG and OAG recommendations sometimes relies on the voluntary will of other governmental bodies, who may chose to ignore them, after all.
Corporate Planning
Contemporary management practice stresses the need for organisations periodically to examine their operating environment so as to respond timely and appropriately to the needs of the organisation and the clientele. With planning, the organisation exhibits the capacity to forecast and influence the course of future events for survival and sustainability. A corporate plan is also a performance instrument that takes stock of past experiences and builds upon them to aspire for better outcomes in the future. An elaborate, sound and viable corporate plan, thus, becomes a major indicator and tool in analysing the institutional capacity of an organisation. The drawback to IG's corporate plan, however, is that while it lays down core objectives, performance indicators and targets, it offers little detail on the specific activities and tasks to be undertaken, or their corresponding time-frames. It is apparent that the IG plan's successful implementation heavily relies on outside partners and donors whose funding is often sporadic and may not be guaranteed.
Nonetheless, the research noted that both Corporate Plans from the IG and the OAG link very well with the national development priorities as enshrined in the poverty sector-wide approach of the PEAP. The premising on the PEAP offers a vantage position in attracting partner support.
Conclusion
The institutional analysis demonstrates that the external control agencies of the IG and the OAG exhibit mixed fortunes of institutional capacity. Despite the continued donor support and the high expectations of better outcomes from the IG and the OAG in pursuit of enhanced accountability and effective public management, these agencies continue to be encumbered by a torrent of financial, human and material resources limitations, as well as deficiencies in the enabling legislation and support from various stakeholders. The deficiencies cause a backlog of cases every year, which a recipe for encouraging public malfunction and a future threat to losing public confidence in these institutions.
The battle against the ills of public sector ineptness requires stronger and committed collaboration and support from different stakeholders. This calls for improved support from Parliament, the CID, the DPP, local authorities and the courts of law to augment the IG's and the OAG's capacity. The delay to concluding court cases, which adversely affect the functioning of the IG, can hopefully be solved with the establishment of a special anticorruption court. Given the sophistication of the means to obscure fraud and corruption, the IG and the OAG staff must be equipped with advanced and specialised investigative training to keep ahead of fraudulent practices. The corporate plans of the IG and the OAG represent a well-thought desire and effort to foster accountability and effective public management, but they should rekindle a proactive approach to strategically build and rejuvenate collaborative relations with other stakeholder agencies to augment their institutional capacity.
